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HUMANIZING THE PAX-AMERICANA GLOBAL 
EMPIRE 
HUMANIZING OUR GLOBAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF IVAN 
HEAD. Edited by Obiora Chinedu Okafor and Obijiofor Aginam. 
University of Toronto Press, 2003. Pp. 214. 
Reviewed by James Thuo Gathii* 
The 2003 United States-led war in Iraq and a series of militarized 
humanitarian missions under the United Nations after the end of the Cold 
War changed the way the world viewed international military action. 
Previously, both liberal and conservative internationalists criticized 
military conquests not preceded by armed attacks. Indeed, critics were 
reluctant to endorse military actions intended to end genocidal violence 
and serious violations of human rights.1 The Bush doctrine of unilateral 
preemptive action radically departs from the internationalists’ perception 
of justification for the use of force. First, the Bush doctrine evidences a 
full acceptance of military expansionism in the name of global security in 
the face of international terrorism. Second, it is regarded by many, 
including its proponents, as a strategy for maintaining American global 
dominance.2  
 * Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School.  
 1. See, e.g., Michael Byers, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed 
Attacks, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 721 (2003) (reviewing THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE 
ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS (2002)). But see 2002 NAT’L SEC. STRATEGY, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).  
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they 
can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger 
of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of 
preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of 
armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.  
 We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of 
today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional 
means . . . . Instead, they rely on acts of terror and . . . weapons that can be easily concealed, 
delivered covertly, and used without warning. 
. . . [T]he United States cannot remain idle when dangers gather. 
Id. at 15. For an assessment of this doctrine of preemption, see James Thuo Gathii, Assessing Claims 
of a New Doctrine of Preemption Under the Doctrine of Sources, OSGOODE HALL L.J. (forthcoming 
2005). 
 2. See Paul Wolfowitz, Remembering the Future, NAT’L INT., Spring 2000, at 35, available at 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2000_Spring/ai_61299040 (last visited Oct. 27, 
2004). Wolfowitz argues that Democrats and Republicans in Congress broadly share a goal of 
establishing and protecting a United States-dominated era in the modern post-Cold War period. 
Wolfowitz calls this view the “pax-Americana.” 
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The Bush doctrine is predicated on the view that a pax-Americana 
empire can be built by forcible means. As President Bush has 
unequivocally announced to nations around the world, “you are either with 
us or against us.” Empire by consent is apparently not an option under this 
doctrine. The great project of humanizing global society through 
cooperation on the basis of shared values such as human rights, free 
markets, liberal democracy, and liberal internationalism thus plays a 
subsidiary role in the Bush doctrine. 
While the essays published in Humanizing Our Global Order seem to 
predate the unfortunate events of September 11, 2001, I could not but read 
them against the context of these terrorist attacks. A central question 
uniting the essays is how the institutions created over the last fifty years 
(the United Nations, European Union, World Trade Organization, etc.) 
have sought to promote shared human values that did not depend solely on 
international military might. In fact, prior to the Cold War, restraining 
unilateral action was critical to the maintenance of U.S. hegemony. Until 
the Bush doctrine, cooperation with other countries was not viewed as 
diminishing or compromising U.S. interests or status in the world.3  
Before the 2003 war in Iraq, the United States created a global empire 
based not on territorial occupation or military resolve,4 but on coordination 
 Further, according to Wolfowitz, this strategy ought to reflect the “recognition that the United 
States cannot afford to allow a hostile power to dominate Europe or Asia or the Persian Gulf [and] that 
the safest, and in the long run the cheapest, way to prevent this is to preserve the U.S.-led alliances,” in 
addition to preventing “any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under 
consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.” Id. at 36. 
 In the post-September 11, 2001 environment, this vision is embodied in the National Security 
Strategy, supra note 1. It states, 
The United States must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by any 
enemy—whether a state or non-state actor—to impose its will on the United States, our allies, 
or our friends . . . . Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from 
pursing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United 
States. 
2002 Nat’l Sec. Strategy 30, supra note 1 (emphasis added). The document declares the doctrine of 
pre-emption as 
[D]efending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by 
identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders . . . . [W]e will not hesitate 
to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against 
such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country. 
Id. at 6. 
 3. See, e.g., JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD’S 
ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE (2002).  
 4. Military force has certainly played a role. The invasions of Panama, assisting the Contras in 
Nicaragua and the role of the United State in the Vietnam War are widely cited examples of U.S. 
militarism prior to the end of the Cold War. In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice 
found that the United States had violated norms against use of force inconsistent with the U.N. Charter 
and customary international law. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/5
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of economic exchange and security guarantees. Less powerful countries 
sought to preserve their autonomy by cooperating with the United States. 
Thus, before the war in Iraq, the United States dominated the world 
through its central role in collective policymaking. As a result, it is 
arguable that the pre-2003 global empire was built on invitation and 
consensus. States like Castro’s Cuba, Gaddafi’s Libya, and Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq in the late 1990s were neither invited nor chosen to 
participate in this empire. The United States, in turn, regarded such 
countries as “rogue states.”  
In the post-Cold War period, the United States sought to subordinate 
diverse national elites through compulsion and through shared values of 
international governance within the system of international institutions. 
Under this system, dissent has always stood peripheral to dominant values. 
This dissent was shaped by several competing sources, including: 
inequality of resources; inequality of influence within the global structure; 
and the way international law and institutions are regarded as formalizing 
or disguising the imperial structure of international relations.5 
Humanizing Our Global Order represents part of the larger dissent–
movement against imperial governance of the pax-Americana empire. It is 
a thematically heterogeneous offering of well-written essays that are 
emblematic of the work of Ivan Head, in whose honor the book was put 
together.6 The editors tell us in the introduction that the book asks how to 
“deploy the political will necessary to ameliorate the serious crises our 
world now faces.”7 The range of themes tackled in the process of 
responding to this quest include: the environment; sustainable 
development; the common heritage of mankind; the use of force; the 
protection of minorities; the civil dimensions of military strategy; the 
International Seabed Authority; the modernization of competition law; and 
the legitimacy of the international trading system.8 In short, this is a well-
written, well-researched, and well-argued set of essays. 
The quest of humanizing the global order, the editors tell us, must, at 
its heart, be “animated by a broader-based and people-centered concept of 
development, one that is far more aware of and accepting of the demands 
14 (June 27). 
 5. One of the best critiques of this system is found in MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A 
NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979). 
 6. HUMANIZING OUR GLOBAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IVAN HEAD (Obiora Chinedu 
Okafor & Obijiofor Aginam eds., 2003) [hereinafter HUMANIZING OUR GLOBAL ORDER]. 
 7. Id. at 4. 
 8. Id. at 5. 
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emanating from the South.”9 Although the North-South axis is not the 
organizing theme of the collection of essays, it is certainly a major 
inspiration of several authors.10 In this review essay, I will refer to this 
agenda to more fully include and to be sensitive to southern concerns as 
part of the quest for inclusivity and legitimacy in international governance.  
There are at least three ways in which this collection of essays pursues 
the quest for inclusivity and legitimacy in international governance: first, 
through North-South cooperation, as opposed to co-existence; second, 
through constructivism or inclusion and not simply contributionism in the 
creation of norms; and third, through a process of critical pragmatic 
engagement by the South in its relations with the North. I address each in 
turn. 
COOPERATION AND COEXISTENCE 
A long-standing theme in North-South relations is whether cooperation 
would be a more fruitful framework within which to resolve problems and 
differences than confrontation. The politics of confrontation have been 
characterized by intransigence on both sides in matters such as the New 
International Economic Order, the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 
and, most recently, the divisive agricultural reform proposals of the Doha 
Round of WTO negotiations. During the Cold War, the United States 
exemplified the politics of confrontation and isolationism by walking out 
of organizations like UNESCO and withdrawing from the compulsory 
jurisdiction of disputes of the International Court of Justice. In the same 
period, developing countries formed organizations such as the Non-
Aligned Movement, ostensibly to create an alternative framework of 
South-South cooperation outside the Cold War East-West axis. However, 
with the end of the Cold War and the demise of global bipolarity, an 
unspoken consensus appears to have emerged that cooperation, rather 
confrontation, had emerged as the new global formula of addressing issues 
related to human rights, the environment, and trade. This same post-Cold 
War period saw the rise of militarized humanitarianism in the service of 
ideals–examples include the intervention in Kosovo to prevent genocide, 
 9. Id. at 4. 
 10. See, e.g., Obijiofur Aginam, Saving the Tortise, the Turtle, and the Terrapin, in HUMANIZING 
OUR GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 6, at 12; Karin Mickelson, Co-Opting Common Heritage: Reflections 
on the Need for South-North Scholarship, in HUMANIZING OUR GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 6, at 112; 
Kristy G. Middleton, Modernization of European Community Competition Law Enforcement for the 
Twenty-First Century, in HUMANIZING OUR GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 6, at 125. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/5
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and the restoration of the democratic government in Haiti that was 
deposed by rebel military leaders.11 
Thus, it is evident that cooperation as a framework for resolving global 
problems did not resolve the dangers of militarized conflict that 
characterized the Cold War period.  
Cooperation is premised on the expectation that a participatory process 
of crafting genuinely global norms and institutions to resolve the world’s 
problems provides the most promise for their resolution. Kirsty 
Middleton’s essay on competition law in the European Community (EC) 
exemplifies the hope that inter-state cooperation offers for the resolution 
of monopoly problems in a transnational context.12 Cooperation is 
imperative because an individual state cannot effectively counteract the 
monopolistic competition of large multinational corporations.13 Yet, as 
Middleton reminds us, proposals for such cooperation—for example, the 
cooperation among national courts within the EC—raise difficult 
questions of “procedural harmonization.” Hence, problems have arisen 
with regard to the harmonization in the issuance of interlocutory orders 
and remedies.14 Further tensions exist between EC and national laws with 
regard to the balancing of competitive efficiency, on the one hand, with 
restrictions on competition to promote social, cultural, industrial, and 
environmental objectives pursuant to article 81(3) of the EC Treaty, on the 
other.15 
Olivier A.J. Brenninkmeijer’s essay on the work of and approach taken 
by the High Commissioner on National Minorities in the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is a study of novel forms of 
cooperation intended to prevent deadly conflict.16 The essay is premised 
on the now widely accepted approach of preventive diplomacy, which 
seeks to avoid violence arising from “discriminatory laws, weak regional 
or local autonomy, and ill-considered policies and their outcomes.”17 
Accordingly, OSCE members are encouraged to recognize minorities as 
integral parts of their societies and, where minority communities live 
across national boundaries, to facilitate rather than challenge relations 
 11. See DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDE OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIANISM (2004). 
 12. Middleton, supra note 10. 
 13. Id. at 126. 
 14. Id. at 136. 
 15. Id. at 137. 
 16. Oliver A.J. Brenninkmeijer, Multilateral Prevention of Internal Conflicts in the Face of 
Interethnic Tensions, in HUMANIZING OUR GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 6, at 30. 
 17. Id. at 50. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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between them.18 In so identifying the sources of inter-ethnic tension, the 
preventive diplomacy of the High Commissioner has steered away from 
treating ethnic differences and cultural identity as causes of inter-ethnic 
tension.19 Following these principles, the High Commissioner encouraged 
Hungary and Romania to sign a Treaty on Understanding, Cooperation 
and Good Neighborliness.20 In such instances, the prior consent of the 
OSCE member states to the High Commissioner’s involvement in 
resolving inter-ethnic tensions helps explain the diplomatic machinery of 
this multilateral conflict prevention effort.21 
Ronald St J. MacDonald’s essay argues that the International Seabed 
Authority should be more active.22 MacDonald believes that 
harmonization and cooperation between the Authority and other 
international bodies, such as those established under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the Framework Convention on Climate Change,23 
would help these organizations realize their complementary 
responsibilities in the sustainable management of deep seabed resources.24 
He proposes a tripartite “Memorandum of Understanding” upon which this 
overlapping mandate would be executed. The article further proposes 
initiatives for closer cooperation in ocean affairs.25 MacDonald laments 
that cooperation and coordination have been hampered by a dearth of 
processes sufficient to realize better ocean resources management such as 
joint development regimes and a system of taxation of ocean cables that 
would fund these initiatives.26 
MacDonald’s disappointment is rooted in a classic collective action 
problem of international governance. Simply put, states have varied and 
heterogeneous interests. Thus, in the absence of coercive measures or 
incentives to cooperate based on shared values or some other mechanism, 
states do not tend to act in their common interests. For instance, it may be 
easier for richer nations to exploit ocean resources individually rather than 
collectively. In such situations, co-existence becomes the default rule. 
 18. Id. at 48. 
 19. Id. at 50. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 55. 
 22. Ronald St J. MacDonald, The International Seabed Authority: Challenges and Opportunities, 
in HUMANIZING OUR GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 6, at 168. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 173. 
 25. Id. at 173. 
 26. Id. at 174–77. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss1/5
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Thomas Franck’s essay on the use of force best exemplifies a world 
where co-existence, rather than cooperation, reigns.27 Franck reiterates his 
argument that the U.N. Charter’s prohibition against the use of force is 
obsolete.28 However, he qualifies this argument by asserting that the 
Charter has evolved through interpretations to accommodate the use of 
force in order to allow humanitarian missions, prevent gross abuses of 
human rights, and to promote democracy.29 This evolution, Franck argues, 
has allowed the United Nations to maintain its relevance, and secure over 
time the “acquiescence of the international system.”30 
Franck discusses instances when the use of force without security 
council authorizations, while controversial and contested, was justified as 
self-defense (anticipatory or otherwise). He concludes there is “a 
calibrated range of tolerance depending on ascertainable and perhaps 
definable contextual variables” and speculates that new principles are 
emerging to govern the use of force.31 Franck concludes by suggesting that 
“no constitution can flourish if its branches can be torn off by any 
malevolent passer-by,” but “[f]lexibility in fundamental law needs to be 
supported by the inflexible probity of the factual and contextual evidence 
to which that law is applied.”32 
Franck wants to have his cake and eat it, too. He tells us that the 
prohibition on the use of force has now been relaxed, yet he laments that 
malevolent “passers-by” threaten what is left of the prohibition.33 Franck 
also suggests that safeguarding against such malevolence can be done only 
on a case-by-case basis.34 Yet, it is hard to maintain the credibility of such 
an ad hoc approach in the face of questions that require a principled and 
predictable response to avoid the spectre of an anarchic world where 
unilateral exertions of force in interstate relations became normalized. 
Franck’s proposals are dangerous because they may be viewed as a status 
quo legitimation of unilateralism by powerful states unwilling to play by 
the rules of international law.35  
 27. Thomas M. Franck, The Use of Force in the Struggle between Humanity and Unreason, in 
HUMANIZING OUR GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 6, at 80. 
 28. Id. Franck first announced this in 1970. See Thomas Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? 
Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force By States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 836 (1970). 
 29. Franck, supra note 27, at 81. 
 30. Id. at 83. 
 31. Id. at 85. 
 32. Id. at 86. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. For a similar view, see James Thuo Gathii, Foreign and Other Economic Rights Upon 
Conquest and Under Occupation: Iraq in Comparative and Historical Context, 25 PA. J. INT’L ECON. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Franck seems overly influenced by ideas of power and interest and, as 
a result, he distances the normative considerations that underlie the 
international legal norms and rules prohibiting the use of force.36 Franck 
therefore promotes an anarchical and abstract notion of sovereignty as the 
sole template guiding state behavior, and he does not reserve space for a 
set of values37 to guide the making of exceptions to the prohibition of the 
use of force. Indeed, those who follow Franck’s analysis are susceptible to 
the shifting predilections that justify ever-increased instances of forcible 
measures. If it turns out that Franck’s analysis adjusts the norm that 
prohibits use of force in international relations in order to suit the political 
expediences of powerful states, then his vision of the U.N. Charter as a 
flexible and adaptable framework has transformed the Charter’s restraint 
on the use of force. 
Karen Guttieri’s essay on civil dimensions of military strategy tells us 
that “the final determinant of the military as a humanizing force is the will 
of civilian policymakers who deploy it.”38 Guttieri’s essay examines the 
merits of U.S. military democratization operations. She concludes that the 
record is mixed.39 Guttieri tells us that the U.S. Army’s civil affairs 
doctrine is essentially a post-conflict policy intended to “protect and 
control populations, restore order and facilitate the transition from 
hostilities to peace.”40  
From a public international law point of view, the principles governing 
an occupier are found in the Hague Regulations of 1907.41 Article 43, in 
particular, empowers an occupying state to restore and ensure public order 
and safety while respecting the laws of the occupied state.42 However, the 
conquered states have often had to undergo large-scale social and 
economic transformation. This is certainly the case in present-day Iraq. 
The transformation of Iraq into an open market economy illustrates how 
military necessity and the political and hegemonic objectives associated 
with the transformation of Iraq—rather than the civil-military relations 
L. 491 (2004) (arguing that the United States has progressively sought to be free from the constraints 
of international law in its foreign affairs); Byers, supra note 1 (arguing that Franck’s arguments 
implicitly license powerful governments to take advantage of less powerful States). 
 36. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 35–37 (1991). 
 37. C.f., TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 19 (1983). 
 38. Karen Guttieri, The Civil Dimension of Strategy, in HUMANIZING OUR GLOBAL ORDER, 
supra note 6, at 87, 102. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 101 (internal citations omitted). 
 41. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277. 
 42. Id. art. 43. 
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discussed by Guttieri––have justified U.S. occupying power that goes 
beyond what is permissible under the Hague Regulations of 1907.43 
CONSTRUCTIONISM AND CONTRIBUTIONISM 
Contributionism is premised on a simple model of inter-civilizational 
participation in the process of crafting genuinely universal norms.44 The 
problem with contributionism is that, like cooperation, it overstates the 
importance of participation by diverse constituencies in the creation of 
global norms, while telling us little about how such norms are 
implemented. It is really the process of implementing norms, and not only 
their formation, that demonstrates biases and blindspots that evidence the 
interests that prevail at crucial stages of implementation. In addition, 
norms negotiated through an inclusive process of lawmaking could reflect 
priorities consistent with the interests of some dominant groups at the 
expense of others. 
Constructivism is premised upon the need for new voices and values to 
supplement state-based lawmaking processes as part of coordinated 
international action taken in order to resolve global problems.45 Unlike 
contributionism, constructivism focuses on the influence of new voices in 
conjunction with the voices of established states in legitimating global 
norms. Jutta Brunnée’s essay on the making of multilateral environmental 
agreements adopts such a constructivist lawmaking model.46 She refers to 
constructionism as “a continuous interactional process.”47 By her account, 
lawmaking obtains legitimacy through fulfillment of internal criteria of 
legitimacy rather than through state consent.48 
One method of fulfilling the criteria of internal legitimacy, Brunnée 
argues, is by triggering domestic legitimation processes, such as civil 
society participation, before incurring international obligations.49 
However, multilateral lawmaking has moved away from such domestic 
 43. For a more expansive discussion, see Gathii, Foreign and Other Economic Rights, supra note 
35. 
 44. See, e.g., PRAKASH SINHA SURYA, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(1996). 
 45. See e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, “Indigenous Peoples” in International Law: A Constructivist 
Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT’L. L. 414 (1998); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept 
of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 
345, 358–60 (1998). 
 46. Jutta Brunée, Between Sovereignty, Efficiency, and Legitimacy, in HUMANIZING OUR 
GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 6, at 62. 
 47. Id. at 63. 
 48. Id. at 65. 
 49. Id. at 67. 
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mechanisms. Thus multilateral law-making has become increasingly 
perceived as having a democratic deficit. In addition, the gains from 
increased transparency and the participation of civil society in multilateral 
lawmaking do not necessarily eliminate the danger of a democratic deficit 
or, more importantly, they do not adequately address issues of substantive 
fairness.50 
Brunnée argues this democratic deficit is best addressed when legal 
arguments are “broadly congruent with existing norms and practices.”51 In 
other words, the inclusiveness of “shared understandings” results from an 
inclusive interactional framework that involves diverse actors in 
constructing and reconstructing norms. This “shared understanding,” in 
turn, influences conduct and promotes compliance between norm and 
praxis. To succeed, an application of interactional lawmaking does not 
require abandonment of consent-based multilateral treaty-making, but 
requires the development of new means of treaty-making that strive for 
internal legitimacy and that seek to provide “rules that ask reasonable 
things.”52 
While the interactional or constructivist approach offers hope for 
resolving issues of democratic legitimacy, it may be more useful where a 
relatively homogeneous group of state and non-state actors share common 
commitments—for example, the movement to arrest ozone-layer 
depletion. In contrast, in contexts where issues represent incommensurable 
differences or values, such as agricultural reform in the WTO, an 
interactional or constructivist framework would face significant 
challenges. 
The following discussion of the critical pragmatic approach addresses 
challenges that arise from these incommensurable differences. One such 
difference, as discussed in the Obijiofor Aginam chapter,53 arises between 
developing and developed countries in the context of conflict between 
Northern versus Southern environmental values. 
Like Brunnée, Robert Shum’s article on the institutional legitimacy of 
the WTO is organized around the question of enhancing the legitimacy of 
an international organization.54 While he argues that the WTO has gained 
the legitimacy of certain private constituencies, he notes that it is far from 
 50 James Thuo Gathii, Process and Substance in WTO Reform, 56 RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming 
2004). 
 51. Id. at 69. 
 52. Id. at 70–71. 
 53. Aginam, supra note 10. 
 54. Robert Shum, The Institutional Legitimacy of the International Trade System, in 
HUMANIZING OUR GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 6, at 149. 
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being considered legitimate in the eyes of groups that feel alienated by the 
WTO’s goals and global trading mandate.55 For the WTO to gain 
legitimacy before these groups, Shum argues, it must include these 
constituencies when defining its goals.56 Exclusion of civil society groups 
like environmentalists, he argues, may cause a particular negotiation to 
deteriorate into “anger when combined with the perception that certain 
constituencies do indeed have privileged access to the organization.”57 
Greater representation, participation and accountability are the linchpins of 
any effort to increase the legitimacy of the WTO. Shum also calls upon the 
WTO to work in collaboration with institutions like the International 
Labor Organization in these efforts.58 However, Shum acknowledges, in 
many areas including labor standards, controversy between developing 
and developed countries will remain for the foreseeable future59 because, 
unfortunately, there are many dissatisfied constituencies and no quick 
fixes. 
Protectionism takes subtle forms in the modern era. One example that 
can be cited is the setting of environmental standards, including “green 
protectionism.” The United States and European Union have also used the 
WTO’s dispute settlement process to delay changing otherwise illegal 
trade practices, thereby harming the legitimate trade interests of less 
powerful states. In addition, protectionist forces in developed countries 
have selfishly held their governments ransom, making it virtually 
impossible to reform global agricultural rules so that developing countries 
can earn legitimate returns on otherwise competitive farm products. 
TOWARD A CRITICAL PRAGMATIC (OR THIRD WORLD) APPROACH TO 
NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES 
A critical pragmatic approach involves investigating, selectively 
embracing, and combining the egalitarian values of non-Western and 
Western legal, customary, religious, and cultural norms, rather than 
relying on dominant narratives that reinforce the patriarchal hierarchy or 
narrow aims of either.60 Under this approach, markets, states, laws, and 
 55. Id. at 150. 
 56. Id. at 163. 
 57. Id. at 159. 
 58. Id. at 160. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., Celestine I. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to 
Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 381 
(2000) (describing the critical pragmatic approach).  
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norms interact fluidly, although any one of these norms may often take 
precedence over the others in this quest for a non-hegemonic order. Part of 
this approach, therefore, involves analyzing these overlapping norms and 
determining whether any of them has a hegemonic relationship in relation 
to the others. If so, policymakers must determine how to arrest such a 
hegemonic relationship in order to achieve an egalitarian and democratic 
ethos. 
Karin Mickelson’s essay on the common heritage of mankind deploys 
this approach by uncovering ways that it has been interpreted in order to 
limit its utility as a means of attaining global redistributive justice.61 She 
does not regard the common heritage of mankind as a tool for opening up 
resources (such as the deep seabed) that only benefit countries with the 
capability of exploiting them. Instead, Mickelson agrees with Mohammed 
Bedjaoui in arguing that the common heritage principle results in unfair 
and unequal distribution of resources.62 Thus, she advocates for the 
principle to be reconstrued as a principle of global solidarity, which can, in 
turn, be applied as a means of avoiding tragic outcomes. For example, 
based on such a principle of solidarity, the resources of the global South 
could be used to address questions of hunger, disease and poverty, and not 
simply to enrich rich and powerful nations. An important illustration of 
this concept is the prevention of mass starvation during famines when, 
meanwhile, food is plentiful in another part of the world.63 
Consistent with this approach, which Mickelson dubs “Third World,” 
Bhupinder Chimni has observed that the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources should be viewed from a material, 
rather than a formal or statist, interpretation to avoid overlooking its 
originating motivation of addressing the inequities of resource exploitation 
between alien colonial rulers and formerly colonized peoples.64 As 
Mickelson reminds us, Ivan Head’s legacy compels us to remain 
compassionate world citizens––we must not simply be critical of the 
North, but we must also be vigilant against all oppression originating in 
the South.65 This, then, is the sum of the critical pragmatic approach: there 
must be not only a more inclusive, but a more just and compassionate 
global order. 
 61. Mickelson, supra note 10, at 122. 
 62. Id. at 118–19. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Bhupinder Chimni, The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: 
Towards a Radical Interpretation, 38 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 208, 214 (1998) (reviewing NICO SCHRIJVER, 
SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES (1997)). 
 65. Mickelson, supra note 10, at 122. 
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For his part, Obijiofor Aginam discusses how northern hegemonic 
“globalism” has dominated the prevailing orthodoxy of sustainable 
development, at the expense of the “environmentally friendly and 
sustainable conservation practices” that are so important to many 
indigenous societies.66 In his view, this hegemonic, state-centric 
framework of sustainable development has facilitated environmentally 
harmful practices by multinational corporations.67 This critique leads to his 
proposal of integrating ecologically sound indigenous practices into a 
sustainable development framework by balancing environmental 
conservation with sustainable exploitation.68 
Aginam advocates an approach intended to avoid the environmentally 
disastrous consequences of the prevailing sustainable development 
models, which privilege the protestant ethic of individual industrialism at 
the expense of community interests. Aginam also draws from principles of 
international human rights and self-determination to inform the rich matrix 
of approaches he proposes to resolve the contemporary crisis bedeviling 
the global sustainable development movement.69 Like Mickelson and 
Bedjaoui, Aginam calls for the inclusion of conservation and sustainable 
use as part of the core of the sustainable development agenda. Aginam 
therefore agrees with Justice Weeramantry’s observation that a vision of 
sustainable development that excludes and silences competing conceptions 
from around the world or that does not incorporate the developmental 
aspirations of the poorest members of the global community ought to be 
considered illegitimate.70 
CONCLUSION 
Cooperation, constructivism, and the critical pragmatic approach have 
a role to play in “humanizing” the global order, as explained in the essays 
in this collection. Each of these approaches serves a useful role in its own 
unique way. Ultimately, in the era of a global pax-Americana empire, 
resistance within and against the empire must also have a place at the table 
if the values of the post-Second World War international system—non-use 
of force, the rule of law in international relations and the entire corpus of 
international human rights guarantees—are to continue to be relevant. 
 66. Aginam, supra note 10, at 13. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 25. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 23–24. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p121 Gathii book pages.doc2/14/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
134    WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4:121 
 
 
 
 
Humanizing Our Global Order contributes in no small way to this crucial 
engagement. 
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